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Abstract
We model the formation of networks as the result of a game where by players
act selfishly to get the portfolio of links they desire most. The integration of player
strategies into the network formation model is appropriate for organizational networks
because in these smaller networks, dynamics are not random, but the result of in-
tentional actions carried through by players maximizing their own objectives. This
model is a better framework for the analysis of influences upon a network because it
integrates the strategies of the players involved. We present an Integer Program that
calculates the price of anarchy of this game by finding the worst stable graph and the
best coordinated graph for this game. We simulate the formation of the network and
calculated the simulated price of anarchy, which we find tends to be rather low.
1 Introduction
In recent years, there has been extensive efforts to collect large amounts of data related
to underlying social networks in order to characterize the social network in some useful
way [1]. Social network analysis (and its various branches) is a large subject with several
devoted texts e.g., [2, 3]. It is impossible to provide a complete literature survey in a short
space and most of the papers are not necessarily germane to the topics discussed in this
paper. Nevertheless, we provide a small sampling of the literature to illustrate the breadth
of research in social network analysis. [4] suggests methods for predicting future events based
on social media, while [5] is specifically interested in the identification of specific anonymous
individuals within a given social network. [6] investigates the problem of mathematically
modeling crowd-sourcing. This work is extended in [7]. There is substantial interest from
the statistical physics community in this problem in the form of Network Science (see the
sequel). [8] investigate models for the growth of social networks. Very little of this work uses
game theoretic principles as we do in this paper, however, [9] investigates the problem of a
user deciding to join a social network from a game theoretic perspective.
A specific application of this analysis is to aid in the discovery of a malicious network (e.g.
an organized crime network). Interested readers can see [10] for a more commercial appli-
cation of the same techniques. These methods are focused on the discovery of a subnetwork
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with particular characteristics, but they do not offer insight into the analysis of potential
courses of actions that may be taken to influence the network. For example, suppose that we
consider the small five player organization shown in Figure 1.1. In this organization, the red
Figure 1.1: What will happen if the red node is removed? Will the network dissolve (left)
or reform (right)
node is the center of the organization. It seems intuitive that the center of the organization
should be attacked in some way (e.g. captured or killed). However, it is unclear whether the
organization will crumble as shown on the left by a set of disconnected nodes or if the graph
will reform as a stronger network, as shown on the right. Let us instead consider a typical
firm rather than a crime organization. If the CEO is removed for some reason (e.g. retires,
is arrested, or dies), the firm may encounter a drop in the stock price or market shares as
an indication of some struggling, however, it is very unlikely that it will collapse. If the firm
does collapse, it will not be quick or as a sole consequence of this event. The firm will likely
reorganize by replacing the CEO in some manner. Sometimes this benefits the firm as the
new leader or reorganized organization is better than before and yet other times, the firm
may encounter a steady decline under the new weaker leadership. It is our position that the
analysis of player interaction in a crime organization should use the same methodologies as
those for analyzing the interactions of players in other organizational environments.
In this paper, we take the point of view that players in such a network will make strategic
decisions on with whom to connect. These decisions may reflect instructions from a central
authority, but it is the player who acts in his own best interest to carry these instructions
out. Using a game theoretic model of players and how they connect, will allow us to model
the reformation of a network as a result of an influential act upon it. In this respect, this
approach seeks to shed light on the problem facing authorities after they discover such a
malicious network. To our knowledge, no organization has attempted to use game theoretic
techniques to study the network formation or reformation process to inform policy on kill or
capture operations.
While a game theoretic approach allows the analysis of influence on a network, it requires
knowledge of the value functions of the players involved. It is not possible to have perfect
knowledge of these value functions and we defer a discussion of this problem to future work.
To be sure, application of this technique requires that player objective functions be estimated.
However, such a requirement is not inconsistent with current operational requirements for
identifying and targeting members of organizations.
2
2 Related Literature from the Physics Community
The Network Science community has largely dedicated its efforts to the exposition and
analysis of topological properties that occur in several real-world networks; e.g., scale-freeness
[11–14]. Recently, there has been interest in showing that these topological properties may
arise as a result of optimization, rather than some immutable physical law [15]. As Doyle et
al. [15] point out, various networks such as communications networks and the Internet are
designed by engineers with some objectives and constraints. While it is true that there is
often not a single designer in control of the entire network, the network does not naturally
evolve without the influence of designers. In each application, the network structure must
be feasible with respect to some physical constraints corresponding to the tolerances and
specifications of the equipment used in the network. For example, in a system such as the
world wide web, a single web-page might have billions of connections, however it is not
possible for a node to have such a degree in many other applications, such as collaboration
or road networks. Certainly the structure of the network has a significant impact on its [the
network’s] ability to function, its evolution, and its robustness. However network structures
often arise as a result (locally) of optimized decision making among a single agent or multiple
competitive or cooperative agents, who take network structure and function into account
as a part of a collection of constraints and objectives. Recently, network formation has
been modeled from a game theoretic perspective [16–19], and in [20], it was shown that
there exists games that result in the formation of a stable graph with an arbitrary degree
sequence. In [21], it was shown that a network with an arbitrary degree sequence may result
as a pairwise stable graph with link bias in the player strategies. In this paper, we show that
we may formulate an optimization problem to measure the price of anarchy of stable graphs
for this network formation game.
3 Preliminary Notation and Definitions
Let N = {1, 2, . . . n} be the set of nodes (vertices) in a graph. Following the graph formation
game literature [19,22–24], a graph is denoted as g and represents a set of links (edges) (where
a link is a subset of N of size two). This notation is consistent with the notion of a simple
graph (i.e., a graph with out multiple edges or self-loops) in the standard graph theory
literature; see, e.g., [25]. In this paper, it will be more convenient to denote a graph as
x = 〈xij〉 where:
xij = xji =
{
1 if node i is linked to node j
0 else
(3.1)
We assume xii = 0 for all i ∈ N . Note x is the symmetric adjacency matrix [26] for a graph
g and we consider only non-directed simple graphs. Denote X as the set of all graphs over
the node set N , that is, X = {x : x ∈ {0, 1}n×n}.
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Let ηi(x) : X → R denote the degree of node i in graph x, which is computed:
ηi(x) =
∑
j
xij = xi·e (3.2)
where e is an n-dimensional column vector filled with 1’s, that is e = (1, 1, . . . 1)T ∈
Rn×1. Denote η(x) : X → Rn as the degree sequence of the graph x; i.e., η(x) =
(η1(x), η2(x), . . . , ηn(x)), which can be computed:
η(x) = xe (3.3)
Note, we break slightly with the notation in the literature. In (e.g.) [27] a degree sequence
is listed in descending order. We do not have this requirement as we we will be interested
in conditions where certainly player’s in a graph formation have a certain desired degree.
Let [x]η be the equivalence class of graphs with the same degree sequence as x. A
degree sequence d = (d1, . . . , dn) on n nodes is graphical, if there exists a graph with n
nodes and degree sequence d = (d1, . . . , dn). The `l-norm between two degree sequences
d = (d1, . . . , dn) and k = (k1, . . . , kn) is given as:
‖d− k‖1 =
n∑
i
|di − ki| (3.4)
We define a graph x to be closest in `l norm to degree sequence d if it is a graph in X with a
degree sequence that has the minimum `l norm distance to d of all graphs in X. Naturally,
this graph may not be unique. Formally, x is a closest graph to degree sequence d if:
‖η(x)− d‖1 = min
x′∈X
‖η(x′)− d‖1 (3.5)
4 Network Game Notational Preliminaries
In the network formation game, each player selects a strategy that consists of a set of
preferences for with whom they would like to form a link. The preference of each player
toward each link is represented in a matrix s where sij denotes the preference for node i to
link with node j:
sij =
{
1 if Player i desires to link with Player j
0 else
(4.1)
We define sii = 0 to be consistent with our assumptions from the previous section. Player i
will select strategy si· from the set of all possible strategies Si = {0, 1}n−1. In this game, each
player has the ability to veto a link. That is, the formation of a link requires participation by
both players as is consistent with many social networks. Hence each Player i selects strategy
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si· and all together a strategy s = [si·]i∈N is identified from S = S1 × S2 × · · · × Sn. As a
result of the strategy chosen, a simple graph x is formed:
xij = xji =
{
1 if sij = sji = 1
0 else
(4.2)
The value of a graph x is the total value produced by agents in the graph; we denote
the value of a graph as the function v : X → R and the set of of all such value functions as
V . An allocation rule Y : V ×X → Rn distributes the value v(x) among the agents in N .
Denote the value allocated to agent i as Yi(v,x). Since, the allocation rule must distribute
the value of the network to all players, it must be balanced ; i.e.,
∑
i Yi(v,x) = v(x) for all
(v,x) ∈ V ×X. The allocation rule governs how the value is distributed and thus makes a
significant contribution to the model. Denote the game G = G(v, Y,N) as the game played
with value function v and allocation rule Y over nodes N . In this game, each agent (node) is
a selfish profit maximizer who chooses strategy si· to maximize there allocated payoff under
allocation rule Y and value function v.
Jackson and Wolinksy [17] suggest that Nash Equilibrium analysis for this game may lead
to inconsistencies between intuitive expected behavior and equilibrium behavior. A Nash
Equilibrium is defined as any solution such that no player can unilaterally change strategies
to benefit himself. For any potential link between two nodes i and j, the solution with no
link (i.e., xij = 0) is an equilibrium even if both players could benefit from the link. This
is because each player has link veto power and therefore, no player can unilaterally create a
link with any other player.
In order to provide a more intuitive equilibrium concept for this model, Jackson and
Wolinksy use pairwise stability to model stable networks without the use of Nash equilibria
[17]. We will first denote x + ij as the graph x with the additional link ij and x− ij as the
graph x without the link ij.
Definition 4.1. A network x with value function v and allocation rule Y is pairwise stable
if (and only if):
1. for all i, j if xij = 1, Yi(v,x) ≥ Yi(v,x− ij) and
2. for all i, j if xij = 0 then, if Yi(v,x + ij) > Yi(v,x), then Yj(v,x + ij) < Yj(v,x)
Pairwise stability implies that in a stable network, for each link that exists, (1) both
players must benefit from it and (2) if a link can provide benefit to both players, then it, in
fact, must exist. Jackson notes that pairwise stability may be too weak because it does not
allow groups of players to add or delete links, only pairs of players [28]. Deletion of multiple
links simultaneously has been considered in Belleflamme and Bloche [29]. Previously, in [20]
we extend work in [30] and [18], showing that stable networks may be formed as a result of
a link formation game with an arbitrary (desired) degree sequence. This work presupposes
that we embed the degree sequence (implicitly or explicityly) into the objective functions of
the players.
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Theorem 4.2. Let f : R → R be a nonnegative convex function with minimum at 0 and
let d = (d1, . . . , dn) be a degree sequence. In G(v, Y,N), assume that Player i maximizes
objective Yi(x) = −fi(ηi(x)) = −f(ηi(x) − di) = −f(
∑
j xij − di). Assume that v is the
balanced value function induced from the allocation rule Y = (Y1, . . . , Yn). If η
−1(d) is non-
empty (i.e., d is graphical) then any graph x such that η(x) = d is pairwise stable for the
the game G(v, Y,N).
Proof. See [20].
5 Link Bias
The model presented in Theorem 4.2 requires that each player have a similar objective
function and, essentially, a desired degree – or a special number of individuals to whom he
wishes to connect. While this is a good first model for many applications, and establishes the
relative ease with which Network Science metrics can be incorporated into a game theoretic
framework, in real-world situations each player usually has a bias toward linking with a
specific set of players rather than others. In this section, we incorporate a player’s preference
to link to one player over another. The incorporation of link bias does not change the fact
that given any degree sequence, there exists a game that will result in a pairwise stable graph
with such a degree sequence [21].
Assume each player minimizes a cost fi : X → R. In this framework, we assume that
Yi(x) = −fi(x) and the player maximizes Yi(x). Consistent with Theorem 4.2, we assume
the value function v in G(v, Y,N) is defined implicitly from the Yi(x) (i = 1, . . . , n) so that
v is balanced. For the remainder of this section we assume a linear cost function:
fi(x) =
∑
j
cijxij (5.1)
As in the prior model a link between players i and j exists if and only if the two players
decide to link. That is, a player may unilaterally reject a link.
5.1 Stability
In this model, Player i will benefit from linking with any Player j whenever cij < 0 and
Player i will be penalized for linking with any Player j whenever cij > 0. We may have an
unspecified behavior when cij = cji = 0. In this case it will neither help nor hinder either
player to establish a link. To remove this possibility, we may assume link parsimony. That
is, we will assume that a link is established if and only if both players benefit in some way.
The stability condition becomes:
Definition 5.1. A network x is pairwise stable if (and only if):
1. for all i, j: if xij = 1, then cij < 0 and cji < 0
2. for all i, j: if xij = 0, then if cij ≥ 0 then cji ≤ 0
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We show in [21], that given an arbitrary degree sequence d = (d1, . . . , dn) we may con-
struct a cost matrix c, whose components are the objective function coefficients cij, such
that the resulting graph formation game has as a (pairwise) stable solution a graph with
degree sequence d. The construction of c is done by an optimization problem.
Definition 5.2. As in the previous section, the preference of Player i to link with Player j
is indicated via sij where:
sij =
{
1 if player i can benefit from link ij
0 if player i cannot benefit from link ij
Remark 5.3. Specifically, sij is the boolean mapping of cij:
sij =
{
1 if cij < 0
0 if cij ≥ 0
(5.2)
Lemma 5.4. A graph x = 〈xij〉 is stable if and only if it satisfies the following constraints:
xij = xji ∀ ij
sij + sji − 1 ≤ xij ∀ ij
xij ≤ sij ∀ ij
xij ≤ sji ∀ ij
xij, sij ∈ {0, 1} ∀ ij
(5.3)
Proof. See [21].
Remark 5.5. Note the linearity of the constraints in both sij and xij suggests we could
introduce additional constraints to the constraints in Expression 5.3 and solve for both x
and s. If there is a feasible solution (x, s) to the constraints, then this solution can be used
to generate a cost matrix c. In fact, it can be used to generate an infinite number of cost
matrices, the simplest one given by:
cij =
{
−1 if sij = 1
1 if sij = 0
(5.4)
Proposition 5.6. Let d = (d1, d2, . . . , dn) be a degree sequence and consider the following
constraints: ∑
j 6=i
xij = di ∀ i
xij = xji ∀ ij
sij + sji − 1 ≤ xij ∀ ij
xij ≤ sij ∀ ij
xij ≤ sji ∀ ij
sij ∈ {0, 1} ∀ ij
(5.5)
7
If (x, s) is a feasible solution to the constraints in Expression 5.5, c is a cost matrix con-
structed from s as in Expression 5.4 and f1, . . . , fN : X → R are player cost functions with
Yi(v,x) = −fi(x) = −
∑
j cijxij, then x = 〈xij〉 is a pairwise stable solution for G(Y, v,N)
and has degree sequence d = (d1, d2, . . . , dn), where v is the balanced value function defined
from Yi (i = 1, . . . , n).
5.2 Construction of Cost Matrix via Optimization
If there is no feasible s to the constraints in Expression 5.5, the first constraint may be priced
out and the nonlinear integer program (Expression 5.6) may be solved to find a solution (x, s)
such that the resulting graph x is pairwise stable for G(Y, v,N) as defined in Proposition 5.6
and degree sequence of x is as close possible to d in the `1 metric.
min
∑
i
∣∣∣∣∣∑
j 6=i
xij − di
∣∣∣∣∣
s.t. xij − xji = 0 ∀ i < j
sij + sji − 1 ≤ xij ∀ ij
xij ≤ sij ∀ ij
xij ≤ sji ∀ ij
xij, sij ∈ {0, 1} ∀ i, j
(5.6)
Problem 5.6 may be reformulated as Problem 5.7, which has linear objective function and
nonlinear constraints.
min
∑
i
ei
s.t.
∣∣∣∣∣∑
j 6=i
xij − di
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ei
xij − xji = 0 ∀ i < j
sij + sji − 1 ≤ xij ∀ ij
xij ≤ sij ∀ ij
xij ≤ sji ∀ ij
xij, sij ∈ {0, 1} ∀ i, j
(5.7)
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This problem can be reformulated as a purely linear integer programming problem (Problem
5.8).
min
∑
i
ei
s.t.
∑
j 6=i
xij − di ≤ ei ∀ i
−
∑
j 6=i
xij + di ≤ ei ∀ i
sij + sji − 1 ≤ xij ∀ ij
xij ≤ sij ∀ ij
xij ≤ sji ∀ ij
xij − xji = 0 ∀ i < j
xij, sij ∈ {0, 1} ∀ i, j
(5.8)
Remark 5.7. The following theorem is an immediate result of the equivalence of Problem 5.8
and Problem 5.6 and Proposition 5.6.
Theorem 5.8. Suppose d = (d1, d2, . . . , dn) is a degree sequence, (x, s) is an optimal solution
to Problem 5.8, c is a cost matrix constructed from s as in Expression 5.4 and f1, . . . , fN :
X → R are player cost functions with Yi(v,x) = −fi(x) = −
∑
j cijxij, then x = 〈xij〉 is a
pairwise stable solution for G(Y, v,N) and has degree sequence as close as possible to d in
the `1 metric, where v is the balanced value function defined from Yi (i = 1, . . . , n).
Proof. See [21].
Remark 5.9. Theorem 5.8 shows how to construct a link biased game that encapsulates a
specific degree sequence d. The resulting game (or class of games) hides the degree distribu-
tion in the objective functions of the players in a non-obvious way, illustrating how arbitrary
degree distributions can be hidden within the objective functions of individual players. This
also suggests the need to investigate general value function inference from data, which we
discuss in our future work.
6 Price of Anarchy
When networks form as a result of selfish competition among nodes, the resulting stable
network may not, in fact, be system optimal. It is possible that a stable configuration is
achieved in which each node does worse than if a central planner had optimized the system.
In this circumstance, we would like to measure the collective penalization due to decentralized
control. This collective price has been called the price of anarchy, which is measured as the
ratio between the worst equilibrium and the centralized solution.
The price of anarchy [31] is a method to measure the inefficiency of equilibrium, but
the development of the analyisis of the inefficiency of equilibriums predates the price of
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anarchy [32]. There already exists multiple variations of the price of anarchy (e.g. Pure
Price of Anarchy, Mixed Price of Anarchy), for the different types of equilibriums that
exist. In this paper, we have defined pairwise stability rather than using the typical Nash
Equilibrium, so this foreshadows the presentation of an analogue to the price of anarchy in
the sequel.
The price of anarchy has been used to measure the inefficiency in congestion networks
[33, 34]. In these games, each user of the network has a source and destination and they
must pay a cost to travel from their source to their destination. The latency or cost of each
link in the network increases with congestion, that is as the number of players that use it
increases. Economically, we may think of capacity on the network (specifically between an
origin destination pair) as a commodity being supplied. As more users want that commodity,
the price increases. Each user will selfishly minimize his own cost via route selection. The
inefficiency of the system is calculated by measuring the total cost of the system when users
act selfishly versus the total cost when users act in a coordinated manner by a centralized
solution.
The price of anarchy is calculated as:
ρ =
maxx∈X
∑
i Yi(x)
minx∈E
∑
i Yi(x)
=
maxx∈E
∑
i fi(x)
minx∈X
∑
i fi(x)
(6.1)
where the set E ⊂ X is defined as the subset of equilibrium solutions. In this system,
this ratio is a useful measurement because minx∈X
∑
i fi(x) > 0. In models such as the
traffic congestion model, there is an inherent minimum cost to traverse a link due to the
fact that each link has a certain minimal traversal time. The congestion from other players
and lack of capacity causes an additional cost, which is measured as a ratio of the physical
cost. However, this property is simply not true of all games where players act selfishly. In
models of network formation, there is not necessarily an inherent cost to the system. It is
possible that due to the desires and constraints of the players involved, there is some cost
that must be absorbed by some set of players, but this is due to the inconsistency of the
players’ desires, resources, and constraints. In the case where there is no such inconsistency
and it is possible for all players to satisfy their desires, there is an optimal cost of zero. In
these circumstances, for these applications, it does not make sense to examine the ratio as
the denominator may be zero. Hence, we calculate the price of anarchy as:
ρ = max
x∈X
∑
i
Yi(x)−min
x∈E
∑
i
Yi(x) = max
x∈E
∑
i
fi(x)−min
x∈X
∑
i
fi(x) (6.2)
In this measurement, we measure the total additional cost of the worst selfish equilibrium
over the best coordinated solution and denote this as the price of anarchy.
The price of anarchy is a measure of the collective unhappiness of players due to selfish-
ness. It is calculated as a function of the objective function of each player. Unless otherwise
stated, we will return to the assumptions made in Section 4 that Yi(x) = −fi(ηi(x)) =
−f(ηi(x) − di) where f is convex with a minimum at 0. The shape of the function f will
have a considerable influence on which graph is the worst stable. An infinitely steep function
f could have an infinitely large objective value for the worst equilibrium.
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For computational ease and to obtain closed form theoretical results, we will consider
fi(ηi(x)) = f(ηi(x) − di) = |ηi(x) − di|. This function provides additional insight into the
game because, for the best and worst graph, it measures the `1 distance between the degree
sequence of the graph generated through selfish decision making and a graph with the degree
sequence closest in the `1 metric to the target degree sequence d.
6.1 The Worst Stable Graph
6.1.1 Link Bias Game
Proposition 6.1. Assume c is a cost matrix in the link bias game G(Y, v,N) where Yi =
−∑j cijxij and v is the balanced value function induced by Yi (i = 1, . . . , n). Let sij be
defined by Expression 5.2. If x is a solution to the integer programming problem:
max
∑
i
∑
j
cijxij
s.t. xij = xji ∀ ij
sij + sji − 1 ≤ xij ∀ ij
xij ≤ sij ∀ ij
xij ≤ sji ∀ ij
xij ∈ {0, 1} ∀ ij
(6.3)
then x is a stable graph with the minimum net payoff.
Proof. This is clear from the objective function and Lemma 5.4.
6.1.2 Degree Sequence Game
Next, we consider the model where Player i has an allocation function Yi(v,x) = −fi(ηi(x))
where fi : R → R is convex with a minimum at di. In this section, we define an integer
program to find the stable graph with the worst total allocation for the players involved in
the game. The feasible region of this integer program will be the set of stable graphs.
Remark 6.2. Define:
rij(x) =
{
1 if Yi(v,x) ≥ Yi(v,x− ij)
0 else
(6.4)
and
pij(x) =
{
1 if Yi(v,x + ij) > Yi(v,x)
0 else
(6.5)
and
qij(x) =
{
1 if Yj(v,x + ij) < Yj(v,x)
0 else
(6.6)
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Since stability is simply a propositional statement with propositions rij(x), pij(x) and qij(x),
it can be shown that the following nonlinear integer programming problem will produce the
stable graph with the minimal net payoff [35]:
min
∑
i
Yi(v,x)
xij = xji ∀ i < j
(1− xij) + rij(x) ≥ 1 ∀ i, j
xij + (1− pij(x)) + qij(x) ≥ 1 ∀ i, j
xij ∈ {0, 1} ∀ i, j
(6.7)
However, the integer programming problem in its raw form is highly non-linear and therefore
not efficient for computing the worst stable graph that can result from an arbitrary Yi(v,x).
Lemma 6.3. A graph x = 〈xij〉 with value function v and allocation rule Yi(v,x) =
−fi(ηi(x)) where fi is convex and has a minimum at di is pairwise stable if and only if:
1. for all i,
∑
j 6=i xij ≤ di
2. for all i, j 6= i, if xij = 1, then
∑
l 6=i xil ≤ di and
∑
l 6=j xlj ≤ dj
3. for all i, j 6= i, ∑l 6=i xil < di and ∑l 6=j xlj < dj =⇒ xij = 1
Proof. Suppose x is pairwise stable. If for any Player i,
∑
j 6=i xij > di, then Player i could
unilaterally drop one link and obtain a more favorable payoff. Thus, it is clear
∑
j 6=i xij ≤
di since we assumed Condition 1 of pairwise stability that for all i, j, if xij = 1, then
Yi(v,x) ≥ Yi(v,x − ij). Thus Constraint 1 must be true. Constraint 2 follows from this
argument as well. If we assume for all i, j if xij = 0 then, if Yi(v,x + ij) > Yi(v,x), then
Yj(v,x + ij) < Yj(v,x) then this is equivalent to assuming if xij = 0 then if
∑
k 6=i xik < di
then
∑
k 6=j xjk = dj. If we take the contrapositive of Constraint 3, then we obtain: if xij = 0
then
∑
i 6=j xik = di or
∑
k 6=j xjk = dj. Using a simple logical equivalence, we may rewrite
this expression as: if xij = 0 then if
∑
i 6=j xik 6= di then
∑
k 6=j xjk = dj. Since we’ve proved
Constraint 1 must hold,
∑
i 6=j xik 6= di is equivalent to
∑
i 6=j xik < di. Thus, Constraint 3
follows from Condition 2 of pairwise stability.
Conversely, suppose these three conditions hold. The logical equivalence between Con-
straints 1 and Constraint 3 and Condition 2 of pairwise stability has already been established
in the forgoing argument. By Constraint 2, we know that if xij = 1, then each Player i has
degree at most di, the value that maximizes his payoff function. Thus, setting xij = 0 (effec-
tively constructing x − ij would yield a lower payoff for both Player i and Player j. Thus,
Condition 1 of pairwise stability is established.
Definition 6.4. Let u be a vector of slack variables on the degrees of the nodes in the game.
Then:
ui =
{
di −
∑
l 6=i xil if
∑
l 6=i xil < di
0 else (i.e.
∑
l 6=i xil = di)
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Similarly, let z to be the binary mapping of the vector u with:
zi =
{
1 if ui > 0 (i.e.
∑
l 6=i xil < di)
0 if ui = 0 (i.e.
∑
l 6=i xil = di)
Remark 6.5. Note we will not consider the case when
∑
l 6=i xil > di because each player has
the unilateral power to veto any connection.
Lemma 6.6. Let Yi(v,x) be as in the statement of Lemma 6.3. Let d be a degree sequence
and let x = 〈xij〉 with vectors u,z derived from Definition 6.4. Then x is stable if and only
if the following constraints are satisfied:∑
j 6=i
xij + ui = di ∀ i (6.8)
zi + zj − 1 ≤ xij ∀ i, j 6= i (6.9)
zi ≤ ui ∀ i (6.10)
ui ≤ dizi ∀ i (6.11)
xij = xji ∀ i, j 6= i (6.12)
ui ≥ 0 ∀ i (6.13)
zi ∈ {0, 1} ∀ i (6.14)
xij ∈ {0, 1} ∀ i, j 6= i (6.15)
Proof. Suppose that x is stable and u and z are defined appropriately. Clearly, xij = xji
holds. By Lemma 6.3 we must have
∑
l 6=j xlj ≤ dj and so ui ≥ 0 and Constraint 6.8 holds by
definition. Further it is clear 0 ≤ ui ≤ di for all i. By Definition 6.4, if ui = 0, then zi = 0
and thus zi ≤ ui and ui ≤ dizi. The fact that ui ∈ Z+ is ensured by the integrality of x so
if ui > 0 then ui ≥ 1 thus ui ≥ zi = 1 and as we observed ui ≤ di = dizi.
Conversely, suppose the constraints hold. That x is a graph is clear. Trivially,
∑
l 6=j xlj ≤
dj. Suppose that ui, uj > 0. Then necessarily zi, zj = 1 since Constraint 6.11 must hold.
Thus, by Constraint 6.9 xij = 1 and we have established the first and third constraint of
Lemma 6.3. Conversely, suppose that xij = 1. Then zi and zj may take any value to
satisfy Constraint 6.9 and the second constraint of Lemma 6.3 must hold. This completes
the proof.
Theorem 6.7. Let Yi(v,x) be as in the statement of Lemma 6.3. Let d be a degree sequence.
The solution to the following integer programming problem yields a graph x that is stable and
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has the worst net payoff function of any stable graph.
max
∑
i
ui
s.t.
∑
j 6=i
xij + ui = di ∀ i
zi + zj − 1 ≤ xij ∀ i, j 6= i
zi ≤ ui ∀ i
ui ≤ dizi ∀ i
xij = xji ∀ i, j 6= i
ui ≥ 0 ∀ i
zi ∈ {0, 1} ∀ i
xij ∈ {0, 1} ∀ i, j 6= i
(6.16)
Proof. The statement follows at once from Lemma 6.6 and the assumptions on Yi(v,x) made
in Lemma 6.3.
Example 6.8. Consider a simple example with 10 players who each have convex cost functions
with minima at 5. That is, each player would prefer to link with no more and no less than 5
other players. Thus, the ideal graph solution is one in which each player resides in a 5-regular
graph. This setup yields an instantiation of the integer programming problem in Expression
6.16:
max
∑
i
ui
s.t.
∑
j 6=i
xij + ui = 5 ∀ i
zi + zj − 1 ≤ xij ∀ i, j 6= i
zi ≤ ui ∀ i
ui ≤ 5zi ∀ i
xij = xji ∀ i, j 6= i
ui ≥ 0 ∀ i
zi ∈ {0, 1} ∀ i
xij ∈ {0, 1} ∀ i, j 6= i
with solution visualized in Figure 6.1: If we assume the objective function of each player is
fi(η(x)) = |ηi(x)− 5|, then the worst case net payoff is 6. In this solution, we see Players 1
and 2 both have degree 2, each missing 3 connections.
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Figure 6.1: The worst solution to the problem in which 10 players each desired to link with
5 players. The objective function in this case is 6.
6.2 The Best Graph
6.2.1 Link Bias Game
Proposition 6.9. Assume c is a cost matrix in the link bias game G(Y, v,N) where Yi =
−∑j cijxij and v is the balanced value function induced by Yi (i = 1, . . . , n). Let sij be
defined by Expression 5.2. If x is a solution to the integer programming problem:
min
∑
i
∑
j
cijxij
s.t. xij = xji ∀ ij
xij ∈ {0, 1} ∀ ij
(6.17)
then x is a (potentially unstable) graph with the maximum net payoff.
6.2.2 Degree Sequence Game
In this section, we define an integer program to find the graph with the best total allocation
for the players involved in the game. Note that we are not necessarily looking for a stable
graph, so the feasible region is the set of all graphs. This will provide a baseline to evaluate
the worst price that may be paid for selfish competition (e.g. the Price of Anarchy).
Remark 6.10. In the general case, the following nonlinear integer programming problem will
yield the graph that provides the largest net payoff:
max
∑
i
Yi(v,x)
xij = xji ∀ i < j
xij ∈ {0, 1} ∀ i, j
(6.18)
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Again, the integer programming problem in its raw form may be highly non-linear and
therefore not efficient for computing the graph of interest for any possible Yi(v,x).
Previously, there has been work on generating graphs with an arbitrary graphical degree
sequence [36–39]. However this literature is mainly concerned with the algorithms to generate
a graph for a graphical degree sequence. Here we seek to find the closest graph to any degree
sequence (graphical or not) and we use an optimization formulation to do this. That is,
we focus on the problem in which Yi(v,x) = −|ηi(x) − di|. For our specific function, we
formulate a math program by defining the feasible region as the set of all graphs and then
minimizing the sum of the player’s cost due to penalization for acquiring a degree different
than desired.
min
∑
i
∣∣∣∣∣∑
j 6=i
xij − di
∣∣∣∣∣
s.t. xij − xji = 0 ∀ i < j
xij ∈ {0, 1} ∀ i, j
(6.19)
This nonlinear integer programming problem is easily reformulated to a linear integer pro-
gramming problem:
min
∑
i
ei
s.t.
∑
j 6=i
xij − di ≤ ei ∀ i
−
∑
j 6=i
xij + di ≤ ei ∀i
xij − xji = 0 ∀ i < j
xij ∈ {0, 1} ∀ i, j
(6.20)
This integer program minimizes the distance between the arbitrary degree sequence d =
{d1, . . . , dn} and the degree sequence of a graph in the feasible region.
Theorem 6.11. The graph generated by an optimal solution to the integer program:
min
∑
i
ei
s.t.
∑
j 6=i
xij − di ≤ ei ∀ i
−
∑
j 6=i
xij + di ≤ ei ∀ i
xij − xji = 0 ∀ i < j
xij ∈ {0, 1} ∀ i, j
(6.21)
is a closest graph under the `1-norm to a graph with degree sequence d = {d1, . . . , dn}.
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Example 6.12. Now, the price of anarchy is simply the difference of the objective function
value from the worst graph (Problem (6.16)) to the best graph (Problem (6.21)). Continuing
Example 6.8, the degree sequence in question is graphical. Thus, a globally optimal solution
is one in which each player is adjacent to 5 other players. This is shown in Figure 6.2. We
Figure 6.2: A best solution to the problem in which 10 players each desired to link with 5
players. The objective function in this case is 0 and moreover, this graph is stable.
note that this graph is not only a globally optimal solution, it is also a pairwise stable graph.
As before, we are assuming that fi(η(x)) = |ηi(x)− 5|. Since the objective function value is
0, it is easy to see that that price of anarchy as defined in Equation 6.2 is 5.
6.3 Complete Example
Using a link bias game, we can illustrate a complete example of the process by which a
modeler might make use of these techniques. Suppose that after studying a 10 player decen-
tralized network, a cost matrix c is constructed to identify link bias between players. This
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cost matrix might be:
c =

0 −85 −29 13 −25 −94 −19 −97 10 10
75 0 9 32 78 27 −55 −38 −44 −61
−85 19 0 48 23 18 71 −36 26 −26
−19 25 35 0 −67 18 −50 −69 −3 −20
57 17 80 51 0 63 −17 69 −62 −78
83 81 20 20 −81 0 35 −15 −83 −4
−45 89 39 −46 −36 −51 0 2 9 5
68 92 −35 35 −88 51 −86 0 88 −91
58 −2 26 −54 91 38 50 99 0 −44
−43 −46 −74 −17 −62 −38 −94 −59 63 0

(6.22)
Using this information, the worst net payoff stable graph can be identified from Problem
6.3. The value to the organization under this strategy is 1077 units of reward. If the group
were organized centrally, the value to the group would be 1487 units of reward, computed
from Problem 6.17. The resulting graphs are shown in Figure 6.3. Since the two community
(a) Worst Graph (b) Best Graph
Figure 6.3: The worst stable graph and best centrally coordinated graph using the cost
matrix c.
payoffs are positive, we can analyze the price of anarchy using the traditional ratio method
and we see that decentralized play leads to a approximately ∼ 72% of the payoff that would
come from centralized coordination. Naturally, if the player’s true network resembled the
centrally coordinated graph rather than the uncoordinated (stable) graph, we might suspect
this network was not selfishly coordinating and our payoff matrix was incorrect.
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Suppose now we isolate a vertex and target it for kill or capture. Without loss of gen-
erality, we have identified that it is possible to kill or capture either Vertex 10 or Vertex
1. In an ordinary network analysis, Vertex 10 is clearly a high priority target since it has
the highest degree. We can explore the impact of removing Vertex 10 from the network by
deleting the 10th row and column from c and recomputing. The resulting graphs are shown
in Figure 6.4. In this case, the uncoordinated network fragments into a tree and a single,
(a) Worst Graph (b) Best Graph
Figure 6.4: The worst stable graph and best centrally coordinated graph after removing
Player 10.
isolated vertex. Furthermore, the new payoffs are 501 reward units for the stable network
and 789 reward units for the new centrally coordinated network. The new price of anarchy
(as a ratio) is ∼ 63%, suggesting we have seriously impacted the ability of the network to
achieve results as good as a centrally coordinated network.
However, suppose it was easier to remove Vertex 1. If we execute this mission, the result-
ing graphs are shown in Figure 6.5. In this case, the uncoordinated graph does not fragment
at all and more importantly the new payoffs are 899 reward units in the uncoordinated stable
graph and 1220 reward units in the centrally coordinated graph. The new price of anarchy
(as a ratio) is ∼ 74%. Removing Vertex 1 actually improves the relative performance of
the network with respect to a centrally coordinated network. Thus we might conclude that
given the opportunity to remove a vertex, we should choose to remove Vertex 10 rather than
Vertex 1, even though these vertices have similar network characteristics. It is interesting
to note in this example there is little correlation between the traditional measures of vertex
importance and their impact on the resulting network’s price of anarchy. Eigenvector cen-
trality and vertex degree for the original worst stable graph (the assumed initial condition)
and the resulting change in price of anarchy are summarized in the table below. Price of
anarchy difference is computed as the original price of anarchy (∼ 72%) minus new price of
anarchy once a vertex is removed. We also include the Communal Change in Utility. This is
the difference in the communal objective function in the original graph (10 players) and the
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(a) Worst Graph (b) Best Graph
Figure 6.5: The worst stable graph and best centrally coordinated graph after removing
Player 1.
communal objective function in the graph that results from removing a vertex (9 players).
The computation is done for each player who could be removed. The information in the table
Removed Vertex Degree Eig. Centrality POA Diff Communal Utility Change
1 2 0.070066565 -0.012608178 178
2 2 0.085041762 0.026391872 153
3 3 0.120257982 0.065375238 285
4 3 0.115436794 0.009530895 190
5 2 0.093603947 0.011948301 193
6 1 0.063208915 -0.03956057 42
7 3 0.092026999 -0.072036296 213
8 2 0.102880448 -0.05390475 221
9 2 0.066087279 -0.003131446 103
10 6 0.191389311 0.089296079 576
Table 1: Summary Table for traditional network importance measures and the corresponding
impact on price of anarchy.
is illustrated in Figures 6.6 and 6.7. It is interesting to note the lack of correlation in these
plots. Obviously this is anecdotal evidence, but suggests interesting future work in so far as
price of anarchy change may be a new way to measure the importance of a vertex in a social
network of interest. We contrast these plots to the plots in Figure 6.7, where we illustrate
the relationship between traditional network metrics and the change in the communal util-
ity. There is clearly a substantial correlation between the degree of a vertex, it’s eigenvector
centrality and the extent to which the removal of this vertex impacts the communal utility.
This is expected since for this game, we can compute the communal utility change when
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Figure 6.6: The price of anarchy change as a function of various vertex importance measures
is illustrated.
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Figure 6.7: The net utility change as a function of various vertex importance measures is
illustrated
.
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vertex i is removed (∆Ui) as shown in Equation 6.23.
∆Ui = −
∑
j
sijsji(cij + cji) (6.23)
For each vertex i, when it is the removed vertex, ∆Ui simply sums up the lost utility for
each vertex i and j for each link that existed in the network before removal. When sij = 0
or sji = 0, this implies the link did not exist and hence, no contribution is made to ∆Ui.
Alternatively, when sij = sji = 1, the contribution made to ∆Ui is the sum of the utilities
received by vertex i and j, which is −(cij +cji). Since, sij = 1 only if cij < 0 and sji = 1 only
if cji < 0, this means that when the link does exist −(cij + cji) > 0. Hence, only positive
contributions can be made to ∆Ui for each link it has and hence it must be positively
correlated with the degree of vertex i. However, since utility received by a link may be quite
asymmetric when cij << cji, the communal utility change may differ greatly between two
nodes with the same degree.
This example illustrates the importance of understanding what network metrics mean
in a given application. Because each player (and thus the community of players) derives
benefit from being connected to specific players in this game, it is relatively straightforward
to see that network metrics like eigenvector centrality and degree will be highly correlated
to value functions like communal utility change; that is, how much removing a single player
will decrease the total payoff to the network. On the other hand, it is clear that there is little
relationship between the price of anarchy difference and the network centrality measure of
a vertex. Thus, if the goal is to degrade the network’s ability to accumulate utility, then
using eigenvector centrality as a proxy measure in the link bias game should be acceptable.
However, if the objective is to cause the network to function in the least centralized way
possible, then eigenvector centrality may not be as good a proxy measure.
The is most clear in the case when we attempt to optimize both of these objectives in a
kill or capture mission at once. Consider Table 1: Suppose a decision maker’s objective is
to simultaneously maximize the decrease in communal benefits to the network and increase
the price of anarchy as much as possible. Clearly, Vertex 10 is the ideal target; in fact it
is the Pareto optimal solution for that multi-criteria optimization problem. If Vertex 10 is
not accessible, then Vertex 3 is the next obvious target. It too has an undominated payoff
pair for that problem (the net benefit decrease is 285 reward units and the price of anarchy
decreases from 72% to 66%). Interestingly, these two vertices have the highest eigenvector
centrality but not necessarily the uniquely highest degree (in the case of Vertex 3). If Vertex 3
also cannot be killed or captured, then the problem becomes more complicated. Eigenvector
centrality is no longer a good proxy measure since the change in price of anarchy is not
consistent with the change in communal utility.
7 Simulation
Networks that are pairwise stable for a game are pairwise stable because no player has an
incentive to drop a link and no two players have an incentive to add an additional link. The
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price of anarchy measures how much worse the worst possible stable graph is from the best
for a particular game. However, this analysis does not offer insight into the actual formation
of games. The simulation of network formation can offer some additional insight. Moreover,
for exceptionally large games solving the Integer Programming Problems associated with
computing the price of anarchy may be difficult. While it is relatively easy to solve Problem
6.17 or Problem 6.19, it may be difficult to solve Problem 6.16.
7.1 Methodology
In this subsection, we outline the methodology for simulating the formation of a network.
We again denote the current graph as x where:
xij = xji =
{
1 if node i is linked to node j
0 else
(7.1)
We denote the matrix P as the matrix representing potential links:
Pij = Pji =
{
1 if node i could link to node j
0 else
(7.2)
A link ij is a potential link if:
1. Link ij currently does not exist (xij = xji = 0)
2. Node i could benefit from linking to node j (i.e.,
∑
j xij < di)
3. Node j could benefit from linking to node i (i.e.,
∑
i xji < dj)
Now, we introduce our simulation algorithm:
1. Initialize xij = 0, Pij = 1 for all links ij
2. While there exists a potential link (i.e.,
∑
ij Pij > 0):
(a) Randomly select a potential link ij (i.e. randomly choose a pair (i, j) such that
Pij = 1)
(b) Add link ij to the graph, set xij = 1,xji = 1
(c) Delete link ij from the potential links, set Pij = 0,Pji = 0
(d) If node i cannot benefit from linking to any more nodes (
∑
k xik ≥ di), then
remove all of their potential links. That is, set Pik = 0 and Pki = 0 for all k
(e) If node j cannot benefit from linking to any more nodes (
∑
k xjk ≥ dj), then
remove all of their potential links. That is, set Pjk = 0 and Pkj = 0 for all k
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7.2 Numerical Example
Suppose that we want the degree sequence of a stable graph that results from playing the
game described in Theorem 4.2 to have a power law degree distribution. We embed this into
the objectives of the players, so the resulting graph has the proper distribution. Let n = 100
players attempt to minimize their cost function
fi(ηi(g)) = f(ηi(g)− ki) = |ηi(g)− ki|
where the parameter ki for each player and the degree distribution of ki values may be
found in Table 7.1. The distribution of the ki values form an approximate (with rounding
to integers) power law distribution as illustrated in the histogram in Figure 7.2. We note
that this degree sequence is graphical. Thus the solution to Problem 6.21 yields an objective
function that is 0.
Node(s) Number of Nodes ki
1-75 75 1
76-89 14 2
90-94 5 3
95-96 2 4
97 1 5
98 1 6
99 1 7
100 1 8
Figure 7.1: ki values and degree distribution
Figure 7.2: The ki values follow an approximate power law distribution
The price of anarchy is the difference of the objective function value from the worst graph
(Problem (6.16)) to the best graph (Problem (6.21)).
We simulated this game 100 times using the methodology from Section 7.1 to find further
insight. In Figure 7.3 we show the simulation statistics for the degree distribution. For
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example, we see in Figure 7.1 that five nodes would optimize their objectives if they had a
degree of three. In Figure 7.3, we see that in all of the simulations, the minimum number of
nodes with a degree of three was four and the maximum number of nodes with a degree of
three was six. Since, the twenty-fifth and seventy-fifth percentile was five, we know that in
more than half of the simulation runs, five nodes had a degree of three and optimized their
objective. In the other half of the runs, there was only one node too many or one node too
few with a degree of three, this small variation indicates that most nodes get close to their
optimum degree resulting in a rather small price of anarchy. The simulation statistics are
also visually presented as a box plot in Figure 7.2 In each simulation run, we calculated the
Degree min 25th median 75th max
1 75 75 75 75 76
2 13 14 14 14 15
3 4 5 5 5 6
4 1 2 2 3 4
5 0 1 1 2 3
6 0 1 1 2 2
7 0 0 1 1 2
8 0 0 0 1 1
Figure 7.3: Degree Distribution Simulation Results
price of anarchy and plotted the results as a histogram in Figure 7.4. Note the largest price
of anarchy is 10, suggesting that this is the true price of anarchy for the system. That is,
the worst possible outcome of communal utility in competitive play minus the best outcome
in centralized decision making (which is zero, since the degree sequence given is graphical).
The price of anarchy is rather low in most simulation runs. We investigated the distribution
of the contributions to the price of anarchy. As shown in Figure 7.5, the contributions to the
price of anarchy were of higher magnitude and made more often by nodes with a greater ki
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Figure 7.4: The empirical distribution of the price of anarchy.
value. This means that players that desired more links were more often more unhappy than
other nodes who desired a lower degree. That being said, Figure 7.5 and Figure 7.4 show
that most player’s attain their desired degree in most of the simulations.
Degree min 10th 25th median 75th 90th 95th max
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3
6 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 2
7 0 0 0 0 2 3 4 6
8 0 0 0 2 3 4 4 6
Figure 7.5: Price of Anarchy Contributions by Degree
8 Conclusion and Future Directions
In this paper we have studied game theoretic explanations for the formation of networks. We
have shown that networks with interesting structures may emerge as the result of interactive
play between competitive individuals. We have also illustrated a method for computing the
price of anarchy for two types of network games and illustrated the application of this calcu-
lation to kill or capture operations on violent extremist and criminal groups. We concluded
by showing how simulation could be used for evaluating larger networks of interest when
optimization problems become infeasible. There are several future directions of work.
We would like to investigate more complex and more realistic games that will, ideally
produce more lifelike behavior. To do this, we must be able to infer the objective functions
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of the various players. In practice, these are never known and must be estimated, and it may
be quite difficult to even estimate them. It is simply not possible to perfectly observe an
entire graph at a single instance in time. Even if it were possible, relationships often cannot
be characterized by a single binary variable. Nonetheless, each time a graph is observed,
information about the game can be extracted. Investigating the process of identifying these
objective functions is fundamental to extending these techniques to real world situations.
In addition to this, more theoretical work can be done. Obtaining theoretical bounds on
the price of anarchy and on the change in the price of anarchy as a result of vertex removal is
in keeping with the literature on network formation games. In addition to this, investigation
of more complex games in which constraints on players influence strategies is of interest.
The generalized Nash equilibrium games [40] may be of interest in this case and will provide
a richer context in which to model player behavior and therefore more requirements on our
ability to infer player objectives and constraints from observed graphs.
References
[1] K. Dozier, “Cia following twitter, facebook,” Associated Press:
http://news.yahoo.com/ap-exclusive-cia-following-twitter-facebook-081055316.html,
November 2011.
[2] P. J. Carrington, J. Scott, and S. Wasserman, Models and Methods in Social Network
Analysis. Cambridge University Press, 2005.
[3] D. Knoke and S. Yang, Social Network Analysis, ser. Quantitative Applications in the
Social Sciences. SAGE Publications, 2008, no. 154.
[4] S. Asur and B. A. Huberman, “Predicting the future with social media,” AxXiV:
1003.5699v1, Tech. Rep., March 2010.
[5] L. Backstrom, C. Dwork, and J. Kleinberg, “Wherefore art thou r3579x? anonymized
social networks, hidden patterns and structural steganography,” in Proc. 16th World
Wide Web Conference, 2007.
[6] A. Friggeri, G. Chelius, and E. Fleury, “Fellows: Crowd-sourcing the evaluation of
an overlapping community model based on the cohesion measure,” in Proc. Interdis-
ciplinary Workshop on Information and Decision in Social Networks. Massachusetts
Institute of Technology: Laboratory for Ilnformation and Decision Systems, May 31 -
Jun 1 2011.
[7] A. Olshevsky and J. N. Tsitsiklis, “Convergence speed in distributed consensus and
averaging,” SIAM Review, vol. 53, no. 4, pp. 747–772, 2011.
[8] E. M. Jin, M. Girvan, and M. E. J. Newman, “Structure of growing social networks,”
Physical Review, vol. 64, no. 046132, 2001.
27
[9] A. C. Squicciarini, S. Sundareswaran, and C. Griffin, “A game theoretical perspective of
users’ registration in online social platforms,” in Accepted to Third IEEE International
Conference on Privacy, Security, Risk and Trust, October 9 - 11 2011.
[10] W. S. Yang and J. B. Dia, “Discovering cohesive subgroups from social networks for
targeted advertising,” Expert Syst. Appl., vol. 34, no. 3, pp. 2029–2038, 2008.
[11] A. Barabasi and R. Albert, “Emergence of scaling in random networks,” Science, vol.
286, no. 5439, p. 509, 1999.
[12] M. Newman, “The structure and function of complex networks,” SIAM Review, vol. 45,
pp. 167–256, 2003.
[13] S. Dorogovtsev and J. Mendes, “Evolution of networks,” Advances in Physics, vol. 51,
no. 4, pp. 1079–1187, 2002.
[14] R. Albert and A. Baraba´si, “Statistical mechanics of complex networks,” Reviews of
modern physics, vol. 74, no. 1, pp. 47–97, 2002.
[15] J. Doyle, D. Alderson, L. Li, S. Low, M. Roughan, S. Shalunov, R. Tanaka, and W. Will-
inger, “The robust yet fragile nature of the Internet,” Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, vol. 102, no. 41, p. 14497, 2005.
[16] R. Myerson, “Graphs and cooperation in games,” Mathematics of Operations Research,
vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 225–229, 1977.
[17] M. Jackson and A. Wolinsky, “A strategic model of social and economic networks,”
Journal of economic theory, vol. 71, no. 1, pp. 44–74, 1996.
[18] B. Dutta and S. Mutuswami, “Stable networks,” Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 76,
no. 2, pp. 322–344, 1997.
[19] S. Goyal and S. Joshi, “Networks of collaboration in oligopoly,” Games and Economic
behavior, vol. 43, no. 1, pp. 57–85, 2003.
[20] S. Lichter, C. Griffin, and T. Friesz, “A game theoretic perspective on network topolo-
gies,” Submitted to Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory (under re-
vision) [http://arxiv.org/abs/1106.2440], February 2011.
[21] ——, “Link biased strategies in network formation games,” in In Proc. 3rd IEEE Con-
ference on Social Computing, MIT, Boston, MA, October 9-11 2011.
[22] V. Bala and S. Goyal, “A noncooperative model of network formation,” Econometrica,
vol. 68, no. 5, pp. 1181–1229, 2000.
[23] S. Goyal and S. Joshi, “Unequal connections,” International Journal of Game Theory,
vol. 34, no. 3, pp. 319–349, 2006.
28
[24] M. Jackson and A. Van Den Nouweland, “Strongly stable networks,” Games and Eco-
nomic Behavior, vol. 51, no. 2, pp. 420–444, 2005.
[25] R. Diestel, Graph Theory, 4th ed., ser. Graduate Texts in Mathematics. Springer, 2010.
[26] C. Godsil and G. Royle, Algebraic Graph Theory. Springer, 2001.
[27] J. Gross and J. Yellen, Graph Theory and its Applications, 2nd ed. Boca Raton, FL,
USA: CRC Press, 2005.
[28] M. Jackson, “A survey of models of network formation: Stability and efficiency,” Game
Theory and Information, 2003.
[29] P. Belleflamme and F. Bloch, “Market sharing agreements and collusive networks,”
International Economic Review, vol. 45, no. 2, pp. 387–411, 2004.
[30] M. Jackson, Social and economic networks. Princeton University Press, 2008.
[31] E. Koutsoupias and C. H. Papadimitriou, “Worst-case equilibria,” in In Proc. STACS
99, 1999.
[32] P. Dubey, “Inefficiency of nash equilibria,” Mathematics of Operations Research, pp.
1–8, 1986.
[33] R. W. Rosenthal, “A class of games possessing pure-strategy nash equilibria,”
International Journal of Game Theory, vol. 2, pp. 65–67, 1973, 10.1007/BF01737559.
[Online]. Available: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01737559
[34] G. Christodoulou and E. Koutsoupias, “The price of anarchy of finite congestion
games,” in Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of
computing, ser. STOC ’05. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2005, pp. 67–73. [Online].
Available: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1060590.1060600
[35] C. Griffin, K. Testa, and S. Racunas, “An algorithm for searching an alternative hy-
pothesis space,” IEEE Trans. Sys. Man and Cyber. B, vol. 41, no. 3, pp. 772–782, 2011.
[36] T. Britton, M. Deijfen, and A. Martin-L
”of, “Generating simple random graphs with prescribed degree distribution,” Journal
of Statistical Physics, vol. 124, no. 6, pp. 1377–1397, 2006.
[37] R. Milo, N. Kashtan, S. Itzkovitz, M. Newman, and U. Alon, “On the uniform generation
of random graphs with prescribed degree sequences,” Arxiv preprint cond-mat/0312028,
2003.
[38] C. Del Genio, H. Kim, Z. Toroczkai, and K. Bassler, “Efficient and exact sampling of
simple graphs with given arbitrary degree sequence,” PloS one, vol. 5, no. 4, p. e10012,
2010.
29
[39] M. Mihail and N. Vishnoi, “On generating graphs with prescribed vertex degrees for
complex network modeling,” ARACNE 2002, pp. 1–11, 2002.
[40] F. Facchinei, A. Fischer, and V. Piccialli, “On generalized Nash games and variational
inequalities,” Operations Research Letters, vol. 35, pp. 159–164, 2007.
30
